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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of the Case
This case concerns the obligations and conduct of a title insurance company toward its
insured. Respondent Stewart Title Guaranty Company ("Stewart Title") issued a policy
agreeing to indemnify the Appellant, Jerry Mortensen, for losses sustained by reason of a lack
of access to his property. Mortensen's neighbor, Akers, sued him challenging his access
rights. Stewart Title defended the case and took various steps to try to obtain access. Akers
prevailed at trial. Stewart Title then paid Mortensen the policy limits and terminated its
obligations to him. Mortensen appealed the Akers decision and sued Stewart Title in this
action for fraud, breach of contract, bad faith, emotional distress, and punitive damages. The
trial court dismissed all claims on summary judgment and awarded attorneys' fees to Stewart
Title.
Course of Proceedings Below
Mortensen, acting pro se, sued Stewart Title Company of Coeur d'Alene on July 2,
2007. R. Vol. I, p. 1. He was told that he had sued the wrong entity, but nevertheless refused
to agree to substitute in the proper party defendant, Stewart Title Guaranty Company. Stewart
Title Company of Coeur d'Alene moved for summary judgment in January 2008. R. Vol. I, p.
131. Mortensen then retained counsel, who promptly agreed to substitute in Stewart Title
Guaranty Company ("Stewart Title"), the Respondent herein.

Stewart Title moved for summary judgment on February 19,2008. R. Vol. 11, p. 3 11.
The motion sought dismissal of Mortensen's fraud and emotional distress claims based on the
statute of limitations; dismissal of the breach of contract claim because the contract expressly
allowed Stewart Title to do what Plaintiff claimed was a breach, and because Mortensen had
been paid the policy limits and thus had no damages; dismissal of the "bad faith" claim
because it cannot be bad faith to do that which the parties' contract allows; and dismissal of
the punitive damages claim on the assumption that the other causes of action would be
dismissed. R. Vol. 11, p. 296. The court granted the motion in its entirety, by order dated
March 27, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 420.
Stewart Title sought recovery of its attorneys' fees based on Idaho Code $41-1 839(4)
and Idaho Code $12-123. R. Vol. 111, p. 501. It also sought recovery of its costs under Civil
Rule 54(e)(5). R. Vol. Ill, p. 498.
Mortensen moved to reconsider on May 8, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 505. The trial court
denied the motion by order dated June 24, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 586. The court declined to
award Stewart Title its discretionary costs, but awarded it $25,000 in attorney fees and
entered judgment on November 19, 2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 605, 607. Plaintiff filed his Notice
of Appeal on November 28,2008. R. Vol. 111, p. 627.
This case is related to Akers v. Mortensen, et al, Kootenai County Case No. CV-02222, which has been on appeal as Akers v. D.L.White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293 (2005)

(Akers I) and Akers v. Mortensen, Docket No. 33587133694 (Akers II). This Court filed its
most recent opinion on January 22,2009.
Statement of Facts
Mortensen's claims relate to his efforts to develop property in the Coeur d'Alene area
in the mid-1990s to early 2000s. He bought the property in 1994. R. Vol. I, p. 141 (72).
Stewart Title underwrote an owner's policy in which it agreed, subject to the terms of the
policy, to insure Mortensen "against loss or damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance
stated in Schedule A, sustained or incurred by reason of," among other things, "lack of a right
of access to and from the land." R. Voi. 11, p. 261. The "Amount of Insurance" stated in
Schedule A was $200,000. R. Vol. 11, p. 265. Unbeknownst to Stewart Title, Mortensen
bought the property in 1994 knowing there was a potential access problem. R. Voi. 11, p. 362
(transcript pages 233,234).
According to Mortensen, access to the property required crossing property owned by
Dennis and Sherrie Akers. R. Vol. I, p. 2. Akers disputed Mortensen's right to cross. In
November 2001, Mortensen sent a letter to North Idaho Title, the Coeur d'Alene area
company that actually issued the Stewart Title policy. R. Vol. 11, p. 394. In that letter
Mortensen states that he is "quite certain that the neighbor, whose property I cross, will
prohibit me from using that access if he feels he has a legitimate reason to stop me or anyone
else." R. Vol. 11, p. 394. Mortensen demanded quick action from North Idaho Title to "rectify
the situation" and threatened legal action. Id.

The matter was referred to John Holt, a Stewart Title Field Customer Service
Representative from Boise. R. Vol. 11, p. 396. Holt handled the matter from 2001 until 2004,
when threats from Mortensen led Stewart Title to obtain a restraining order to protect Holt
from Mortensen and his partner, David White. R. Vol. 11, p. 256 (76), 282.
Holt contacted the Akers in late 2001, pursuant to paragraph 4(b) of the policy, which
gives Stewart Title the right to "do any other act which in its opinion may be necessary or
desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest, as insured, or to prevent or reduce loss
or damage to the insured." R. Vol. 11, p. 257 (71 I), 262 (74(b)). Mrs. Akers testified at the
September 2002 trial that the purpose of the contact was to ask whether Akers would
quitclaim a portion of her property to Mortensen. R. Vol. I, p. 218 (transcript p. 409, L. 20).
Holt was unable to resolve the access issue.
Akers filed suit against Mortensen and White in January 2002 alleging trespass,
among other claims. R. Vol. I, p. 185. Mortensen tendered the case to Stewart Title, who
retained attorney Michael Reagan to defend Mortensen. R. Vol. 11,256 (76), 257 (77), 398.
Some time during the Akers litigation, Stewart Title obtained a triangular portion of
property from an adjoining landowner named Baker. The property was quitclaimed to
Mortensen. R. Vol. 11, p. 316 (712). Mortensen admits this was done "in an effort to solve
this [the access] problem." Id. Mortensen also admitted that Stewart Title in fact believed the
property belonged to Baker. R. Vol. 111, p. 516. Mortensen testified in this case that
"Ownership of this triangular shaped parcel was disputed throughout the lawsuit started by the

Akers."

R. Vol. 11, p. 316 (712). Despite knowing about that dispute, he and White

nevertheless "began making improvements" to that property. Id. Mortensen did not do the
improvement work in reliance on the Baker quitclaim deed; if he did, that reliance was not
reasonable given that he knew ownership was,in dispute. R. Vol. 11, p. 369 (transcript p. 262,

L. 2-14).
The Honorable John T. Mitchell presided over the trial and decided the case by written
findings and conclusions issued January 2, 2003. R. Vol. I, p. 30. Mortensen alleged
(correctly) that Akers prevailed at trial. R. Vol. I, p. 4 (724). (This Court has since ruled,
among other things, that Mortensen in fact does have access. Substitute Opinion, Docket
Number 33587/33694, dated January 22,2009.)
Following trial Stewart Title and Mortensen debated whether to move to reconsider or
appeal. Several letters were exchanged between counsel for the parties. Ultimately, Stewart
Title elected not to proceed with the case. By letter dated May 14, 2004, Richard Mollerup,
Stewart Title's lawyer, infbrmed Mortensen that the company would be paying him the
specified Amount of Insurance ($200,000) and ending its obligations to him. R. Vol. 11, p.
249. Mr. Mollerup sent Mortensen another letter, dated May 18, 2004, via Federal Express
overnight delivery. R. Vol. 11, p. 251, 252. The letter told Mortensen that under the terms of
the policy: "[tlhe payment or tender of payment of the amount of the insurance terminates all
liability to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation. Therefore, Stewart Title will not be
prosecuting the appeal in Akers v. White and Mortensen." Id. A $200,000 check payable to

Mortensen was enclosed with the letter. Id. The Federal Express record shows the May 18th
package was delivered on May 19". R. Vol. 11, p. 253. In addition, nearly identical letters
were faxed to Mortensen's lawyers. R. Vol. 11, p. 273, 274. Mortensen concedes that he
received the letters and the funds. R. Vol. I, p. 4 , 5 (7727,29).
Stewart Title had no further contact with Mortensen after Mollerup sent him the May
18,2004 letter. R. Vol. 11, p. 241 (73), 244 (777-9), 258(112).

ARGUMENT
Mortensen correctly states the standard of review, except with regard to the award of
attorneys' fees. When reviewing an award of fees, the Court freely reviews the trial court's
decision as to which, if any, statute applies to the situation before it. Ransom v. Topaz, 143
Idaho 641,644 (2006). Whether the particular statute used in awarding the attorneys' fees was
applied properly to a given set of facts is a question of law and the standard of review is one
of free review. Id. at 644 (citing Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Miller,
136 Idaho 571, 573 (2001)). Here, the trial court chose to apply Idaho Code $41-1839(4) and
12-123. R. Vol. 111, p. 604. Once it is determined that the facts justify application of that
particular statute, the trial court's award of attorneys' fees and costs is subject to review for an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 643 (citing Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486 (2003). "The
awarding of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to
review for an abuse of discretion." Id.

A.

All breach of contract claims were ttroperlv dismissed, regardless of theory.

1.

Mortensen was paid the full policy limits, so he has no contract damages and
no contract-based causes of action.

Mortensen has alleged several contract-based theories. He began the case by claiming
Stewart Title breached the insurance contract by not handling the &appeal. See R. Vol. I,
p. 1, 6. He lost that claim on summary judgment because the policy gave Stewart Title the
express right to change its mind and quit defending the case. R. Vol. 11, p. 262 (policy section
6(a)). Mortensen alleged a new theory on reconsideration in which he conceded that the
policy allowed Stewart Title to take action to obtain access for him, but he claimed it did not
do so diligently, in violation of paragraph 4(b) of the policy. R. Vol. 111, p. 515, 516;
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 10. Mortensen also alleged "Bad Faith," in which he claimed
Stewart Title "failed to perform the terms of the insurance contract in good faith." R. Vol. I,
p. 6.
These contract claims all fail for the same reason: Stewart Title paid Mortensen the
h l l policy limits. The policy did not guaranty Mortensen access. Rather, it committed
Stewart Title to indemnify Mortensen for losses "not exceeding the Amount of Insurance"
that were "sustained by reason of a lack of access to and from the land." R. Vol. 11, p. 261. It
is undisputed that the Amount of Insurance was $200,000 and that Stewart Title paid
Mortensen that sum. R. Vol. 11, p. 265; R. Vol. I, p. 5.
Idaho courts have long held that payment of the full amount of a title insurance policy
terminates the insurer's obligations. See, e.g., Anderson v. The Tidle Ins. Co, 103 Idaho 875,

878 (1982). In Anderson, this Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the title insurer
because the insurer had tendered full payment of the policy limits. Anderson, 103 Idaho at
876. The plaintiff alleged that his title report failed to disclose a conveyance of part of the
insured property to a third party. Id The plaintiff refused the carrier's policy limits tender
and sought damages for breach and negligence. Id. The Court found that the insurer had not
purported to act as anything other than a title insurance company, and thus the negligence
claims failed as a matter of law. Id. at 879. Plaintiff was limited to a recovery based on the
contract. Id at 878-879. The court held that "[wlhere title to a portion of insured property
fails, the insured is entitled to recover upon the loss up to the amount of insurance coverape
under the policy." Id at 878 (emphasis added).
Paragraph 6(a) of the Mortensen policy addresses the issue expressly, stating that upon
payment of the Amount of Insurance:
All liability and obligations to the insured under this policy . . . shall terminate,
including any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any
litigation, and the policy shall be surrendered to the Company for cancellation.

R. Vol. 11, p. 262.
The language "or continue any litigation" plainly allows Stewart Title to terminate its
liability to the insured during litigation. Thus, not only does Anderson make clear that
payment of full policy limits is the maximum of the insurer's exposure, but the policy
language itself provides that if the insured decides to pay limits during a case, as it did here,
then its liability ends.

Note too that paragraph 15 of the policy also provides that it is the only agreement
between the parties and that "Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on
negligence, and which arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered
hereby or by any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to this policy." R. Vol. 11, p.
263.
Mortensen is barred from recovering more than the policy limits, regardless of
contract theory and regardless of the meaning of the word "diligently" in paragraph 4(b).
This assumes Mortensen's lack of diligence theory is indeed a contract-based claim. If, on the
other hand, the diligence theory articulates a tort claim, that claim is time-barred. The trial
court addressed this alternative scenario when it held that, "there is no dispute in the record
that Plaintiff knew of the alleged breach by September of 2002; thus, the tort claim is barred
by the four (4) year statute of limitations

..."

R. Vol. 111, p. 587. More specifically,

Mortensen became aware of the Stewart Title contact with Akers when Mrs. Akers testified at
trial on September 11, 2002. R. Vol. 11, p. 214, 218; R. Vol. 11, p. 315 (71 1). He learned
about the Baker quitclaim deed during the Akers litigation. R. Vol. 11, p. 316 (712).
Morlensen did not bring suit until July 2,2007, more than four years later.
This Court's January 22, 2009 Substitute Opinion made clear that Mortensen does in
fact have access. The trial court in the Akers case now has to determine where the access is
and how wide it is. Stewart Title did not make any representations or commitments regarding
the nature or quality of the access. R. Vol. 11, p. 261-267. Again, Mortensen got all he was

promised and then some: a defense, payment of the $200,000 policy limits,

access. He

has no claim for breach of contract, regardless of theory.
2.

Mortensen cites no record evidence to suvwort a claim for lack of dili~ence.

Mortensen's "lack of diligence" claim fails because he cites no record evidence to
support it. He instead simply relies on conclusory statements in his own affidavit.
Mortensen's reconsideration brief leaned heavily on the supposed "facts" surrounding
the Baker property. R. Vol. 111, p. 516, 517. Mortensen considered those events irrelevant
when he testified in h e Akers trial. R. Vol. 11, p. 369 (trial transcript p. 262, L. 2-14). In
explaining his basis ibr thinking he had the right to improve the property, Mortensen testified
that the Baker conveyance was "irrelevant:"
Since that time, uh, for the simple fact that the title company, who defends us,
thought that Mr. Akers might try to get Mrs. Baker to deed him that property,
the title company hired a private investigator, located Mrs. Baker, who is the
owner of that property, which is really kind of irrelevant because we have
easement through that wrovertv whether she deeded it to us or not, but she then
deeded us that property, so now not do we only own that triangular portion,
we have always had an easement through that portion, so all we did was
improve our easement area in there that we have a legal easement to which we
now own.
Id. (emphasis added).

Any lack of diligence by Stewart Title is irrelevant because it is clear that Mortensen
did not rely upon the quitclaim from Baker. But, Mortensen offers no actual evidence of a
lack of diligence. Arguments from his lawyer and self-serving, conclusory statements from
Mortensen do not suffice to defeat an otherwise valid motion for summary judgment.

Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,897 (2007); I.R.C.P. 56. None of the underlined "evidence"
that Mortensen cites is supported in the record:
"Stewart Title told Mortensen and White that it had purchased the small triangle parcel from
Kathryn Baker and placed it in their names so they could use it for access and could make
improvements on it; it was theirs." R. Vol. 111, p. 516. emphasis added.
"It did not place the property in Mortensen and Whites names as it claimed to have done."

Id. emphasis added.
"Mortensen and White built an access road across the small triangular parcel believing it
was theirs and previously Ms. Baker's as Stewart Title had assured them . . ." Id. emphasis
added.
"Stewart Title convinced Mortensen, with a recorded deed from Baker that he owned the
property and thus Mortensen used that property for an access road . . ." Id. p. 5 16,s 17,
emphasis added.
Mortensen cites no deposition or trial testimony to support these supposed statements,
nor does he give any detail. He does not say who "told" him about the purchase from Baker,
or whether it was really him or White who was told. He does not give any details to support
the claim that Stewart Title said it "placed the property in his name." He does not say who
"assured" him, or whether it was really him or White who was assured. He does not say who
"convinced" him about the Baker property or when. Mortensen did not even provide a copy
of the Baker quitclaim deed. His "evidence" is really just conjecture, argument, and guessing,

which is why the trial court found the claims "clearly unsupported by fact or law" and
awarded attorney fees to Stewart Title. R. Vol. 111, p. 604,605.
Mortensen makes similar unsupported statements on appeal. See Appellant's Opening
Brief, p. 4. The only evidence cited is Mortensen's own affidavit, which contains the same
unsupported, conclusory statements as set out above and in the briefing below. See R. Vol. 11,
p. 313, 316.

Mortensen states that "Stewart Title recorded the Quitclaim Deed and

represented to and assured me that I owned the triangular shaped parcel." R. Vol. 11, p. 316.
He does not say who told him this or when. It is surprising indeed that he cannot provide
such basic information if the representation and assurance in fact occurred. The Court should
disregard Mortensen's contentions not just because they are uncorroborated and self-sewing,
but also because they are simply too vague. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 759
(2006) ("[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to
create a genuine issue," the non-moving party must respond to a motion with "specific
facts.").
Regarding the Baker quitclaim deed, the Court should consider too that a quitclaim
deed is not a warranty deed. A11 a quitclaim deed does is convey the grantor's interest in real
property,

w.BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY,
p. 1251 (6th ed. 1990);

Luce v. Marble, 142

Idaho 264, 270 (2005). By contrast, a warranty deed is "a deed in which grantor warrants
good, clear title. A deed which explicitly contains covenants concerning the quality of title it
conveys." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY,
p. 1589 (6thed. 1990) Given that a quitclaim deed

does not warrant title, the fact that Baker, as it turned out, did not have title, does not bear on
"diligence."

Stewart Title never said Baker had title. All that can be inferred from the

evidence is that Stewart Title told Mortensen that "you have title if Bakers had title."
Mortensen admits, however, that title to the Baker property was in dispute throughout the
Akers trial, so he obviously did not reasonably rely on having title. R. Vol. 11, p. 316. The
truth is that Mortensen did not believe the Baker deed gave him anything he did not already
have. See R. Vol. 11, p. 369 (transcript p. 262, L. 2-14). The evidence establishes that
Mortensen relied on his easement rights for access, not on the Baker deed. Id. But Mortensen
knows he has already been compensated for Stewart Title's alleged error relating to the
easement, so he is trying to recast the claim as being based on the Baker deed. His claim is
without merit.
Mortensen's "evidence" about Stewart Title's contact with Akers has the same
shortcomings. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 3, 4. With one exception, all the evidence
consists of is unsupported statements from the same Affidavit of Plaintiff Vernon Jerry
Mortensen (found at R. Vol. II, p. 313). The one exception is the statement that John Holt
contacted Akers in late 2001. Holt does not say what the parties discussed. R. Vol. I, p. 105;
R. Vol. 11, p. 257. For whatever reason, Mortensen chose not to depose Holt.
Regarding Akers, Appellant's Opening Brief relies on the following unsupported
statements from Mortensen's Affidavit:
6.
Sometime thereafter Stewart Title Guarantee Company, based
upon information and belief, recognized the existence of a problem relating to

my legal right to access my property, and the Whites' legal rights of access to
the parcel I deeded to them.
Thereafter, Mr. John Holt, acting on behalf of Stewart Title,
7.
contacted Dennis and Sheni Akers and offered to purchase from them a small
parcel of property and notified Akers that Stewart Title needed that small
parcel to provide legal access and easement to my property and the property I
conveyed to the Whites. According to Mr. Holt's affidavit, he made the above
referenced contact sometime in late 2001.
Stewart Title failed andlor refused to notify or inform me in any
8.
way that it believed there was an accessleasement problem, that it had talked to
the Akers in an effort to cure the access/easement problem or that it tried to
purchase property from Akers to fix the problem. This information was
entirely kept secret from me by Stewart Title.
Once Stewart Title notified the Akers of the access problem, it
9.
triggered the Akers to file suit against me for, among other things, trespass.

The key portions of this are entirely unsupported by record evidence. Mortensen cites
no testimony that Stewart Title "recognized the existence of problem," no evidence of what
was offered or said to Akers, and no evidence that the contact in fact "triggered" Akers to file
suit. Akers testified at trial. John Holt could have. Both were available for deposition in this
case. So, presumably, was Baker. Yet Mortensen does not cite any of their testimony and did
not take any depositions in this case despite having filed the case over seven months before
Stewart Title filed its motion for summary judgment.
Mortensen claims he was not notified of Stewart Title's contact with Akers. The
policy gives him no right to notice (See R. Vol. 11, p. 262), and he cannot show how that
supposed fact is material or how it changed his conduct or the outcome. He doesn't even try.

Moreover, Mortensen concedes that the contact with Akers and Baker was done in an effort to
help him. R. Vol. 11, p. 315 (f/8), 316 (712). Given that Stewart was actively trying to solve
Mortensen's alleged problem, it is hard to see how that shows a lack of diligence. Mortensen
offers only assertions - but no evidence - to the contrary.
Mortensen has not and cannot support his diligence theory. There are no genuine
issues of material fact in the record. Summary judgment was appropriate.
3.

The policy gave Stewart Title the right to refuse to handle the apveal. so
Mortensen's initial contract claim fails.

Mortensen initially claimed Stewart Title breached the insurance contract by failing to
handle (ie. pay for) the Akers appeal. It is not clear whether that theory is part of this appeal.
If it is, it should be dismissed because he was paid the full policy limits. Moreover,
Mortensen has no claim for breach of contract unless he can prove that the title policy
required Stewart Title to "defend him throughout" the Akers case. As the trial court found,
the policy contains no such requirement. R. Vol. 11, p. 424.
The policy allows Stewart Title to do the very thing that Mortensen claims is a breach:
elect, during litigation, to pay the amount of insurance and end its obligations. R. Vol. 11, p.
262(f/6). "Where the language of an insurance policy is susceptible to but one meaning, it

must be given that effect." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins., 136 Idaho 39, 44
(2001). Mortensen never pointed to any specific provision that he claimed was ambiguous. A

party does not breach a contract or implied covenant by merely standing upon the terms of a
contract. Peachtree Settlement Funding v. Wiggins (In re Wiggins), 273 B.R. 839, 878

(Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (Westlaw, p. 40); Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods,

Inc., 121 Idaho 266,288 (1991).
4.

The letters from Stewart Title and Richard Mollerup did not modify the
insurance contract so as to give Mortensen a right to a free appeal.

The letters Stewart Title and its lawyer, Richard Mollerup, sent to Mortensen did not
modify the policy. A contract cannot be modified without an agreement between the parties.

Brand S. Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733 (1981); Wright v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 208, 211
(1980). Any new terms must be complete, definite, and certain. Giacobbi Square v. Pek

Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348 (1983).
The letters state in several places that Stewart Title may move to reconsider "and/or"
appeal, thereby making clear that Stewart Title was keeping its options open. Specifically, in
its January 24, 2003 letter to Mortensen, Stewart Title stated:
As stated in previous correspondence, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Appeal will he decided shortly after the Order is certified as final. In the
interim before the Order is finalized, we will continue to weigh the value in
each option.

Mollerup's February 19, 2003 letter is to the same effect and makes clear that any
decision will be made in consultation with Mortensen and his attorney, not simply between
StewartiMollerup and Mortensen:
Stewart Title intends to continue to provide you with a defense to all claims in
the lawsuit throughout the damage phase of the trial and possible (sic) a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The decision to
file post-trial motions or appeals will be made in consultation with Mr. Reagan

and you based upon the likelihood that specific issues decided in the District
Court may be successfully appealed. This firm will not get involved in those
issues because we do not represent you in that lawsuit.
R. Vol. 11, p. 325,326.
These letters told Mortensen that an appeal was simply one of the options. The policy
also makes clear that Mollerup lacked authority to unilaterally commit Stewart Title to
handling an appeal:
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by a
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto assigned by either the President, a
Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer or
authorized signatory of the Company.
R. Vol. 11, p. 263(115(c)).
That did not occur here.
Mortensen also points to specific language in Moilerup's March 26, 2003 letter that
refers to a prior commitment having been made regarding an appeal. The prior commitment
referred to is the above-quoted language in Mollerup's February 19,2003 letter. R. Vol. 11, p.
329-33 1. The February letter conlains no commitment, certainly not one definite enough to
modify a contract. Like the previous letters, the March 26th letter makes clear that several
issues remain to be resolved and that the parties will need to consult with Mortensen's
counsel, Mike Reagan. Both the February and the March letter, when read in context, make
clear that no definitive promise was made and that Stewart Title was reserving its rights.
Mortensen also relies on language set out in a March 17, 2004 letter from John Holt.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5; R. Vol. 11, p. 323. That letter was written to David White,

not Mortensen. R. Vol. 11, p. 323. The only insurance contract that could be modified by a
letter to White is White's contract, not Mortensen's. Moreover, the language of the letter is
conditional. It discusses what might happen "iP' the judge "perpetuates his original findings
and conclusions." Id. Such a statement is insufficiently definite to modify a contract. See

Brand S. Corp., 102 Idaho 731,733; Wright, 101 Idaho 208,211.
The Court should simply ignore Mortensen's unsupported statement that John Holt
made statements to him over the phone. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5. Mortensen
provides no detail regarding what Holt supposedly said or when. Such flimsy allegations
cannot defeat summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897 (2007); Gibson, 142
Idaho 746,758 (2006).
Consideration is also required for new contract terms. Brand S. Corp., 102 Idaho 73 1,
733. Mortensen presents no evidence of having given anything in exchange for the supposed
right to have Stewart Title handle the appeal.
"Judgment shall be granted to the moving party if the non-moving party fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish an essential element to the party's case." Spur Products
Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 815 (2007). Mortensen has failed to establish
essential elements required for contract modification, namely definite terms and
consideration. The trial court correctly rejected his claim to the contrary.

B.

Mortensen failed to plead or even analvze quasi-esto~~el,
and the policy
authorized Stewart Title's actions. so those actions cannot be unconscionable.
Mortensen's quasi-estoppel claim should be rejected because it was never pleaded.

Rice v. Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 901 (1999); Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 669 (Ct. App.
1984) ("issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings...")
Mortensen never even briefed or analyzed the issue -not even on reconsideration. Instead, he
simply argued at the reconsideration hearing that Stewart Title's conduct was unconscionable.
He cited no case law until this appeal. See R. Vol. 111, p. 518, 519.
Moreover, as the trial court stated in its opinion on reconsideration:
Not only was this theory not pled by Plaintiff, but there is no evidence in the
record to establish that Defendant's change of position was an unconscionable
act given that Defendant's paying Plaintiff the policy limits was expressly
provided for in the insurance contract.

The insurance contract gave Stewart Title the right to defend or pay policy limits and
terminate its obligations. R. Vol. 11, p. 262 (7/6(a)). Here, Stewart did both. The contract also
gave Stewart Title the right to contact Akers and Baker and try to resolve the access issue
through them. R. Vol. 11, p. 262 (14(b)). Indeed, Mortensen urged exactly that. R. Vol. 11, p.
394. Conduct expressly allowed by the contract cannot be "unconscionable." Peachtree

Settlement Funding, 273 B.R. 839, 878. Conduct is "unconscionable" only if it is "not guided
or controlled by conscience" or is "unscrupulous." www.merriam-webster.com. There is
absolutely no evidence before the court that Stewart Title did something inappropriate, much

less something "unscrupulous." Mortensen admits Stewart was trying to solve the problem,
not cause it. R. Vol. 11, p. 315 (78), 316 (712).
Mortensen relies upon thepossibility that he may not have gotten a copy of his policy.
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 13. Central to his argument is his lawyer's statement that
"Stewart Title has not presented any facts to the contrary." Id. This is untrue. Michelle Fink
of North Idaho Title testified that "it has been our practice, including in 1994, to provide our
customers such as Mr. Mortensen with their policies of title insurance (including the policy
jacket) in the mail after close of escrow." R. Vol. 11, p. 345. Mortensen has presented no
evidence that North ldaho Title would not have followed that policy in his case. A11
Mortensen has said is that he does not know whether he got a copy of his policy. In other
words, he very well may have gotten it and the evidence shows that he probably did. In
addition to the Fink testimony, the letters that Stewart Title sent to Mortensen discuss the
terms of the policy in detail, suggesting strongly that Mortensen had a copy of it. See e.g. R.
Vol. 11, p. 320, 325, 396, 398, 404. Again, neither Mortensen's speculation nor his lawyer's
unsupported statements can defeat a motion for summary judgment. In any event, whether
Mortensen got the policy is immaterial because he is not trying to defeat coverage. Whether
he got the policy does not bear on unconscionability.
The Holt and Mollerup letters do not create a foundation for an estoppel claim either
because Mortensen has not shown that he was disadvantaged by, or changed his position in
reliance on, Stewart's decision not to continue with the appeal. After all, Stewart Title

defended Mortensen, including with a motion to reconsider, at no cost to him. R. Vol. 11, p.
257 (77). It was not until the time to appeal that Stewart Title terminated its obligations to
Mortensen. But Mortensen did not lose his right to appeal, he merely lost the benefit of
Stewart paying for that appeal. He would have appealed either way, so he did not change his
position or rely on his supposed belief that his appeal would be free.
Finally, Stewart Title's letters made clear that it was waiting on the outcome of the
motion to reconsider. That decision came on April 1, 2004. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Stewart Title
did not delay, as was the case in Boise Motor Car Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 62
Idaho 438 (1941). Note too that the delay in Boise Motor Car forced the insured to hire
counsel. Id., at 448. That was not the case here. Mortensen has shown no reliance and no
change of position based on the letters at issue.
C.

The emotional distress claim is untimely because the complained of conduct
ceased more than two years before Mortensen filed suit.
Mortensen's fifth cause of action seeks relief for emotional distress based on "Stewart

Title's reckless and negligent actions." R. Vol. I, p. 6, 7. The statute of limitations for
emotional distress claims is two years. Idaho Code
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5-219. For purposes of the statute of

limitations, intentional infliction of emotional distress is a continuing tort. Curtis v. Firth, 123
Idaho 598, 604 (1993). "By its very nature this tort will often involve a series of acts over a
period of time, rather than one single act causing severe emotional distress." Id., 123 Idaho at
604. A continuing tort is defined as:

one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is
repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A
continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is occasioned by
continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original
violation.. . .

Id., 123 Idaho at 603, citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions 5 177, at 231 (1987),
(emphasis added).
When a continued injury is involved, the cause of action accrues when the conduct
ceases. Id. The continuing tort concept, however, is not intended to, "[tlhrow open the doors
to permit filing these actions at any time. The courts that have adopted this continuing tort
theory have generally stated that the statute of limitations is only held in abeyance until the
tortious acts cease." Id at 604.
It is undisputed that Stewart Title terminated its obligations to Mortensen by letter
dated May 18, 2004. See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6. That letter was faxed to his
lawyers on the lgth and sent to him that day by overnight mail. R. Vol. 11, p. 269-274.
Mortensen therefore got the letter no later than May 19, 2004. Mortensen knew on that date
(if not before) that Stewart Title was not going to defend him through an appeal. It is also
undisputed that no further communications occurred between Stewart Title and Mortensen
after the May 18, 2004 letter. R. Vol. 11, p. 241 (73), 244 (777, 8, 9), 258 (712). Mollerup's
billing records show no time entries on this matter after May 27,2004. R. Vol. 11, p. 244 (79).
Furthermore, none of the facts set forth in the Complaint are alleged to have occurred after
that date. Assuming, arguendo, that Stewart Title engaged in continuous tortious conduct

prior to May 18, 2004, any claims based upon such conduct would be barred pursuant to

Curtis and Idaho Code $5-219.
Mortensen misconstrues the implication of a continuing tort. Under Idaho law, a
cause of action accrues for a continuing tort when the conduct ceases. Cobbley v. City of

Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 157 (2002); Glaze v. Defffenbaugk, 144 Idaho 829 (2007); Curtis, 123
Idaho 598,603 (emphasis added). Mortensen's appeal brief mistakenly focuses on the effects
of the conduct. Appellant's Opening Brief, p.15. That is simply the wrong analysis. The
limitation period does not continue simply because the claimant continues to suffer ill effects
from the conduct. Cobbley, 138 Idaho at 157-1 58.

D.

The "lack of diligence" theorv was aroverlv dismissed regardless of whether it
alle~esbreach of contract or a tort: whether it is imalied into the Complaint is
irrelevant.
Mortensen's argument regarding "modern pleading" and so-called notice pleading

(Appellant's Brief, p. 16) misses the point. The "lack of diligence" argument was properly
dismissed regardless of whether it alleged a contract claim or a tort claim, so it is irrelevant
whether liberal pleading standards imply it into the Complaint. The trial court's point on the
"lack of diligence" argument was simply that it was not included as part of the claim entitled
"Breach of Contract." R. Vol. 111, p. 587. The point is impossible to refute. The claim was
pleaded as:

COUNT THREE - BREACH OF CONTRACT
37.

Stewart Title and Mortensen had a contract by virtue of the Title
Insurance Policy, insuring access to the Mortensen Property.

38.

Stewart Title was obligated to defend Mortensen throughout the
Lawsuit, including the appeal and subsequent proceedings in
order to defend Mortensen's access over the Access Road.

39.

Stewart Title failed to fully defend Mortensen in the Lawsuit,
breaching the parties' contract.

40.

As a result of Stewart Title's breach of contract, Mortensen has
been damaged in an amount in excess of $400,000.00.

Mortensen's Breach of Contract claim is plainly based on Stewart Title not handling
the appeal, not whether it acted diligently in dealing with Akers and Baker. Interestingly, this
cause of action does not incorporate the allegations set forth in the Factual Allegations section
of the Complaint, but instead purports to stand on its own. Mortensen's other allegations are
presumably not part of this cause of action.
The trial court's opinion on reconsideration goes on to say that Mortensen's "bad
faith" claim "alleges a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing for failing to
perform the terms of the contract diligently." As established in Sections A(]) and A(2) above,
all of Mortensen's contract-based claims, including this one, were properly dismissed for an
absence of damages and an absence of record evidence.
Even if, as the trial court suggests, "[Tlhis particular bad faith claim, therefore, lies in
tort," the claim would be time-barred because:
There is no dispute in the record that Plaintiff knew of the alleged breach by
September of 2002; thus, the tort claim is barred by the four(4) year statute of

limitations as previously cited by the Court in its Memorandum Decision Re
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

R. Vol. 111, p. 587.
Mortensen cannot ascribe error to the trial court because the diligence claim is either a
contract claim for which there is no damage and no evidence, or it is a time-barred tort claim.
This Court is not bound by the exact rationale explained in the trial court's written decision.

In Re Estate o f Bagley, 1 17 Idaho 1091, 1093 (Ct. App. 1990). It is of no consequence
whether the standards of "modern pleading" allow the lack of diligence theory to be read as a
part of the Breach of Contract cause of action. The trial court should be affirmed.

E.

Award of $25.000 in fees.
The trial court awarded Stewart Title $25,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code

$41-1839(4), which provides that:
4) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, this section
and section 12-123,Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the
award of statutory attorney's fees in all actions between insureds and insurers
involving disputes arising under policies of insurance. Provided, attorney's
fees may be awarded by the court when it finds. from the facts presented to it
that a case was brou~ht,pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation. Section 12-120,Idaho Code, shall not apply to any actions
between insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under any policy of
insurance.
Idaho Code $41-1839(4), (emphasis added).
This case was brought "unreasonably and without foundation." The trial court cited
the frivolous claims statute as well, and Stewart concurs in that. The statute provides:

Frivolous conduct means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel
of record that satisfies either of the following: (i) It obviously serves to harass
or maliciously injure another party to the civil action; (ii) It is not supported in
fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
Idaho Code 5 12-123, emphasis added.
Mortensen produced almost no evidence in this case and took no steps to obtain
evidence. His claims were not supported in fact. His tort claims were not supported by law.
The trial court found that Mortensen's claims were either untimely or "clearly unsupportable
by fact or law." R. Vol. 111, p. 604 (a111 (2)).
"The awarding of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court
and subject to review for an abuse of discretion." Ransom, 143 Idaho 641, 643 (2006).
When deciding whether the particular statute used in awarding the attorney's fees was applied
properly to a given set of facts is a question of law and the standard of review is one of free
review. Id. at 644 (citing Kidd Island Bay Water Users Coop. Ass'n, Inc. v. Miller, 136 Idaho
571,573 (2001)).
As shown above, Mortensen failed to produce any evidence to support his claims
regarding Stewart Title's contacts with Akers and Baker. He took no depositions and cited no
trial testimony to establish the facts he needed to prove his claims. His claims were utterly
unsupported, and thus were not "supported in fact" as required by Idaho Code 512-123. His
tort claims were clearly time-barred. The emotional distress claim is addressed above. The

fraud claim, not on appeal here, was also unsupported by evidence and was clearly filed too
Iate.
Stewart Title incurred significant fees in this case for several reasons.

First,

Mortensen named Stewart Title Company of Coeur d'Alene as the defendant. Despite being
told he had sued the wrong entity, he refused to substitute in Stewart Title Guaranty Company
and forced a motion for summary judgment to be filed. R. Vol. I, p. 20-132. Mortensen then
retained counsel, who stipulated to the substitution, so no hearing was required. Second,
Mortensen has advanced new and different theories of the case, forcing Stewart Title to try to
hit a moving target. The late-coming "lack of diligence" theory is but one example. Third,
Stewart Title's counsel was required to review pleadings and rulings in the Akers litigation,
which were significant.
The fee award was justified and reasonable for these reasons, and should be upheld.

F.

Fees on appeal.
Stewart Title requests its fees and costs on appeal under IAR 41 and IAR 35(a)(5) for

the reasons set forth in Section E immediately above.

CONCLUSION
Stewart Title respectfully requests that the trial court be affirmed and that it be
awarded its fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2009.
Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for ~ e i ~ o n d e n t
Stewart Title Guaranty Company

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of July, 2009,I caused to be served two (2)

bound, true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, and addressed as follows:
Sam Johnson
405 South Eighth Street
Suite 250
Boise, ID 83702

Attorney f o r ~ e s ~ o n d e n t

Addendum
Black's Law Dictionary
* www.merriarn-webster.com

QUO ANIMO
Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus ikwiy

sentat k6madam senMyriy d6bat 6t 6wnasi. He who
receives the advantage ought also to suffer the burden.
Qui sentit onua sentire d e b t et commodum ikwiy
sitnbt 6wnas senMyriy ditbat 6t k6madaml. He who
bears the burden of a thing ought also to experience the
advantage arising from it.
Quisauis erit a u i vult iuriaconsultus haberi conti.
i n e i studiumumum
velit a ~ n o c n n q n edoceri lkwiskwis
6hrat kwiv v5lt iGraskansQltas habiray kantinmwat
st@Ewd(i)yim,v4lai 6y kwowk5gkwiy d&ay/. Whoever wishes to be a jurisconsult, let him continually study,
and desire to be taught by every one.
Quisquis praesumitur bonus; ?t semper in dubiis pro
r w respondend/kwiskw& praz&Ewmabr b6wnas;
6t kmpar in d(y)dwhiyas pr6w riyow rasplnd6ndami.
Every one is presumed good; and in doubtful cases the
resolution should be ever for the accused.
Quit, v. To leave; remove from; surrender possession of;
as when a tenant "quits" the premises or receives a
"notice to quit."
Notice to ouit. A written notice given by a landlord to
his tenant; stating that the former desires to repossess
himself of the demised premises, and that the latter is
required to quit and remove from the same at a time
designated, either at the expiration of the term, if the
tenant is in under a lease, or immediately, if the tenancy is at will or by sufferance.
Quit, udj. Clear; discharged,. free; also spoken of persons absolved or acquitted of a charge.
Qui tacet, consentire videtur Ikwiy tksat, kbnsenthyriy vadiytari. He who is silent is supposed to consent.
The silence of a party implies his consent.
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Qui taeet consentire videtur, ubi traetatur de ejus
commodo ikwiy *at kbnsenthyriy vadiytar, yirwbay
traektiytar diy iyjas k6madowi. He who is silent is
considered as assenting, when his interest is at stake.
Qui tacet non ntiqne fatetur, sed tamen v e m est
eum non negare ikwiy e t ndn yirwiakwiy fatifiar,
s6d *man viram &stiyam n6n nagitriyl. He who is
silent does not indeed confess, but yet it is trne that he
does not deny.
Qui tam action Ikwiy tkm kkehanl. Lat. "Qui tam" is
abbreviation of Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro si ips0 in hac park sequitur" meaning "Who
sues on behalf of the King as well as for himself!' It is
an action brought by an informer, under a statute which
establishes a penalty for the commission or omission of a
that the same shall be recovercertain act, i d
able in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any
person who will bring &ch action and the remainder to
the state or some other institution. It is called a "qui
tam action" because the plaintiff states that he sues as
well for the state as for himself. U.S. v. Florida-Vanderbilt Development Corp., D.C.W., 326 F.Supp. 289, 290.
See also False Claims Act; Whistle-blower Acts

Qui tardius solvit, minus solvit ikwiy tivdiyas dlvat,
mhynas sblvat/. He who pays more tardily [Wan he
ought] pays less [than he ought].
Quitclaim, v. In conveyancing, to release or relinquish a
claim; to execute a deed of quitclaim. See Quitclaim, n.
Quitclaim, n. A release or acquittance given to one man
by another, in respect of any action that he bas or might
have against him. Also acquitting or giving up one's
claim or title.
Quitclaim deed. A deed of conveyance operating by
way of release; that is, intended to pass any title,
interest, or claim which the grantor may have in the
premises, but not professing that such title is valid, nor
containing any warranty or covenants for title. In a
number of states, a deed which purports ta transfer
nothing more than interest which grantor may have, if
anv, at time of transaction, and excludes any implication that he has any title or interest in described realty.
Sabine Production Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,
La.App. 1 Cir., 432 So.2d 1047, 1052. Under the law of
some states t h e grantor warrants in such deed that
neither he nor anyone claiming under him has encumbered the property and that he will defend the title
against defects arising under and through him, but as to
no others. Compare Warranty deed.
Qui timent, cavent vitant Ikwiy Mymant, kkvant
vhytantl. They who fear, take care and avoid.
Qui totdicit nihil excipit ikwiy t6wtam disat
nhy(h)al ithapat/. He who says aU excepts nothing.
Quit rent. A rent paid by the tenant of the freehold, by
which he goes quit and free,-that is, discharged from
any other rent. 2 B1.Comm. 42.
Quittance /kwitans/. An abbreviation of "acquittance;"
a release (q.u.).
Qui vult decipi, decipiatur ikwiy v6t ditsapay,
dasipiyitytari. Let him who wishes to be deceived, be
deceived.
Qnoad hoe ikw6wed h6kl. Lat. As to this; with respect to this; so far as this in particular is concerned. A
prohibition quoad hoc is a prohibition as to certain
things among others. Thus, where a party was complained againet in the ecclesiastical court for matters
cognizable in the temporal courts, a prohibition q d
these matters issued, ie, as to such matters the party
was prohibited from prosecuting his suit in the ecclesiastical court.
Quoad sacra ikw6waed kykral. Lat. A s to sacred
things; for religious purposes.
Quo animo ikwlw &namow/. Lat. With what intention or motive. Used sometimes as a substantive, in lieu
of the single word "animus," design or motive. "The
quo animo is the real subject of inquiry."
Quocumqne mod0 velit; quooumque mod0 possit
/kwowk5mkwiy m6wdow vhlat; kwowIdmkwiy m6wdow
p6satl. In any way he wishes; in any way he can.
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Lineal warranty. In old conveyancing, the kind of warranty which existed when the heir derived title to the
land warranted either from or through the ancestor who
made the warranty.
Pemonal warranty. One available in personal actions,
and arising from the obligation which one has contracted to pay the whole or part of a debt due by another to a
third person. Flanders v. Sealye, 105 U.S. 718,26 L.M.
1217.
Special warranty. A clause of warranty inserted in a
deed of lands, by which the grantor covenants, for himself and his heirs, to "warrant and forever defend" the
title to the same, to the grantee and his heirs, etc.,
all
-by, through, or
the
grantor or his heirs, ~f the
is against the
claims of all
whatsoever, it is called a
warranty. See also Covenant.
Warranty deed. See that title.
Warranty of fitness. Warranty by seller that goods sold
are suitable for special purpose of buyer. See also
Implied warranty of fitness under "Commercial Transactions", above.
Warranty of habitability. Implied warranty of landlord
that the leased premises are properly maintained and
are fit for habitation at time of letting and will remain
so during term of tenancy. Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831.
Under "implied warranty of habitability," applicable
to new housing, builder-vendor warrants that he has
complied with the building code of the area which the
structure is located and that the residence was built in a
workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation,
Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., Colo.App., 563
P.2d 976, 977. See also Habitability.
W m a n t y deed. Deed in which grantor warrants good,
clear title. A deed which explicitly contains covenants
concerning the quality of title it conveys. In some
states, statutes impute warranties or covenants from the
use of specific words, such as "grant." The usual covenants of title are warranties of seisin, quiet enjoyment,
right to convey, freedom from encumbrances and defense of title as to all claims. Compare Quitclaim deed.
Warranty, voucher to. In old English practice, the
a warrantor into court by the party
(when tenant in a real action brought for recovery of
such lands), to defend the suit for him.
Warren. A term in English law for a place in which
birds, fishes, or wild beasts are kept.
A franchise or privilege, either by prescription or
grant from the king, to keep beasts and fowls of warren,
which are hares, coneys, partridges, pheasants, ek.
Atso any place to which such privilege extends.
warren. A franchise for the preserving and custody
of beasts and fowls of warren. 2 B1.Comm. 39, 417.
This franchise gave the grantee sole right of killing, so
far as his warren extended, on condition of excluding
free

WASTE
other persons. 2 B1.Comm. 39. Such was abolished in
1971.
War risk imwanm. See
Warsaw Convention. Treaty concluded in Warsaw, Poland in 1929
of rn~=, including limitation of
liability, for international air travel.
united States
is a party to such treaty.
Warseot lw6rskdtl, In Saxon law, a customary or usual
tribute or contribution towards armor, or the arming of
the forces.
warth. ~n
old ~ ~ ~ llaw,
i s ahcustomaw payment, sup
posed to be the same with wad.penny.
Wash. A shallow part of a river or arm of the sea. The
sandy. rocky, gravelly, boulder-bestrewn part of a river
bottom deposited on level land near mouth of a canyon
representing rooks and gravel washed down by a mountain stream.
Wash hank. A hank composed of such substance that it
is liable to he washed away by the action of the water
thereon, so as to become unsafe to travelers on highway.
Washington, Treaty&, ,
A treaty signed on M~~ 8,
1871, between Great Britain and the United States of
America, with reference to certain differences arising
out of the war between the northern and southern states
of the Union, the Canadian fiheries, and other matters.
washout signal In railroad parlance, emergency signal
meaning to stop immediately. Stinsan v. Aluminum Co.
of America, C.C.A.Tenn., 141 F.2d 682,684.
wash sale. me offsetting sale and purchaae of the same
or similar assetwithin a short time period, F~~income
t , purposes, losses on a sale of stock may not be
if equivalent stock is p u r c h e d within thirty
days before or thirty days after the date of sale. I.R.C.
8 1091.
Transactions resulting in no change in beneficial ownerahip. E m t v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 186,205,96 S.Ct.
1375, 1386, 47 L.Ed.2d 668. A fictitious kind of sale,
disallowed on stock and other exchanges, in which a
broker who has received orders from one person to buy
and from another person to sell a particular amount or
quantity of some particular stock or commodity simply
transfers the stock or commodity from one principal to
the other and packets the difference, instead of executing both orders separately to the best advan*
in
each case, as is required by the ~ 1 e ofs the different
exchanges. Such practices of wash sales and matched
orders by brokers to give impression of active trading in
such securities are prohibited by SEC. 15 U.S.C.A.
5 78i(aXl). See also Sale.
Wash transaction. See Wash sale.
waste. ~ &or insction
i
~ by ~a posmsar of land cawing
urwonable injury to the holders of other estates in
the same land. An abuse or destrnctive use of property
by one in rightful posseasion. Spoil or destruction, done
or permitted, to lands, houses, gardens, trees, or other
corporeal hereditaments, by the tenant thereof, to the
prejudice of the heir, or of him in reversion or m n i n -
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